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Developing countries would gain far more from unilateral trade
liberalization than from multilateral trade liberalization negoti-
ated over many years.  Industrial countrfes could increase both
economic and political incentives for reform by granting credit
when developing countries undertake unilateral trade libernliza-
tion.
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Intornallonal  Trad
Under plausible assumptions applied for Argen-  Those conclusions are based on economic
tina, Nogu6s calculates that  a strategy of  anaiysis, however, and developing countries are
unilateral trade liberalization in Argentina would  increasingly driven by politics - and only
produce significantly more in exports (net  marginally by economics - to participate in the
present value) than would similar liberalization  MTNs.
negotiated multilaterally over a period of 15
years.  If industrial countries were to give develop-
ing countries credit for unilateral liberalization
Waiting to negotiate multilaterally entails a  programs, both economics and politics would
tirue  cost (loss of exports because of continued  shift in favor of faster reform programs. If
misallocation of resources) and an uncertain  credit were given, negotiating in the MTN
benefit (the market access a country expects to  would never  be preferable to unilateral trade
gain bv waiting to negotiate a reciprocal reduc-  liberalization.
tion of trade barriers).  Liberalizing unilaterally
implies a fast increase of exports from improved  The net present value of increased  ports
resource allocation but could imply a loss from a  from unilateral trade liberalization in Argentina
lower degree of market access.  would increase from US$19 billion (if no credit
were given) to US$33.4 billion (if credit were
Generally, Nogues concludes, as long as the  granted in increasing amounts for the first 15
costs a country suffers from its barriers are  years and remained constant thereafter).  And
higher than those from other countries' barriers,  the political excuse for not liberalizing unilater-
it pays that country to liberalize unilaterally.  ally would suffer a major blow.
Developing countries tend to have more  Waiting for multilateral negotiation of trade
protectionist trade policies than the industrial  liberalization is certainly preferable to maintain-
countries.  To the extent that this is so, it proba-  ing protection, however.  Nogues estimates that
bly doesn't pay for developing countries to wait  the present value ot forgone exports would be
to negotiate in the multilateral trade negotiations  US$53 billion if the present degree of protection
(MTNs) - because to the extent that conces-  were to remain unchanged.
sions are balanced, developing countries are not
likely to end up with liberal trade regimes.
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I.  Introduction
This  paper  develops  a framework  for  analyzing  the  economic  costs  and
benefits  of unilateral  and  multilateral  trade  liberalization  strategies.  The
interest  in  this  topic  is  sparked  by  the  apparent  dilemma  faced  by  some
developing  countries  in the  ongoing  Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral  trade
negotiations  (MTNs). An  active  participation  in  the  MTNs  implies  that  wh&c
developing  countries  have  to  bargain  away  is  worth  something  there. If so,  it
might  pay  to  delay  the  introduction  of  unilateral  measures  in the  hope  of
se..uring  increased  access  to  foreign  markets.
Deciding  on the  merits  of  unilateral  and  multilateral  trade
liberalization  strategies  should  involve  economic  and  political  factors.  This
note  will  address  the  economics  of  this  decision.  Section  II will  present  and
discuss  the  conceptual  framework.  Section  III  will  apply  this  framework  to
the  case  of  Argentina.  I  estimate  that  under  plausible  assumptions,  the  net
present  value  of  higher  exports  under  a  unilateral  trade  liberalization
strategy  is  US$23  billion  higher  than  a similar  liberalization  negotiated
mul..ilaterally  during  a period  of 15  years. Section  IV  will  assess  the  extent
to  which  the  findings  for  Argentina  can  be  generalized.  This  section  also
stresses  the  importance  of  the  credit  issue.
1/  I  appreciate  comments  to  a preliminary  draft  received  from  Bela  Balassa,
J. Michael  Finger  and  Patrick  Messerlin  and  research  assistance  from  Ms.
Azita  Amjadi.-2-
II. Conceptual  Framework
Ideally,  the benefits  and costs  of alternative  trade policies  should
refer to resource  allocation  and their  impact  on GNP.  Previous  quantitative
studies  on the  Argentine  economy  have focused  on the  export effects  of
alternative trade  policies.  Therefore,  I will base the discussion  on the impact
of trade liberalization  on this  variable.  Throughout  I assume that
liberalization  does not affect  the trade  balance, i.e.,  changes in  exports equal
changes in imports.
Graph I  depicts the two  alternative  trade liberalization  strategies
under consideration.  At to  a decision  needs to be taken  on whether to
liberalize  or wait until t 1 when the first  among the  future  MTNs will be
negotiated.  Waiting  entails  a true cost  and an uncertain  benefit.  The cost
is given by the loss  of exports (X)  as a consequence  of continued  resource
misallocation.  This loss  diminishes  over time  as the country  bargains  away
its trade barriers.  The uncertain  benefit  is the  market  access that a country
expects to gain by  waiting until t, and negotiating  a reciprecal  reduction  of
trade barriers.  In the graph, I represent  this by a shift  of the time path of
exports from C to C' i.e., from line  I to line  II.  I assume  that there  are no
dynamic gains from trade  liberalization  but only static  resource  allocation
effects which result in  a parallel  upward shift  of the  export growth line.
Thus, the  net economic return  of an  MTN liberalization  strategy  is
given by the difference  between  the present  value of ABCD--cost  of delaying  a
unilateral trade liberalization--with  the present  value  of the  difference
between  C and C' from t 1 to infinity,  i.e.,  the  export  benefit from the
increased  market  access negotiated  at tl.  Note that  I have assumed  that:- 3 -
raph  1:  TIME  PATH  OF EXPORTS  UNDER  UNILATERAL  AND  MULTILATERAL  TRADE
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I.  Time path  of exports  under  unilateral  trade  liberalization  with  no credit  and  no free  ride.
II.  Time  path  of  exports  under  multilateral  trade  liberalization.
III.  Time  path  of exports  under  unilateral  trade  liberalization  with  less- than  full  credit  and/or  free  riding  of the  MTNs.(a)  the  country  will  not  free  ride  the  MTN  negotiated  at tl;
(b)  that  a  unilateral  trade  liberalization  at  to  receives  no credit;
and
(c)  the  trade  liberalization  implemented  at t, is  similar  to  the  one
that  would  have  been  implemented  at to.  It  is  also  assumed  that
there  are  no  policy  reversals.
In regard  to  the  first  assumption,  previous  research  has  shown  that
although  there  has  been  some  internalization  of the  trade  gains  negotiated  by
the  active  participants,  the  MTNs  have  provided  spillover  effects  or  free  ride
gains  (Finger,  1976). Thus,  assuming  no spillover  effects  introduces  a bias
in  favor  of the  multilateral  trade  liberalization  strategy.
Likewise  with  the  credit  issue. If  countries  were  to  receive  full
credit  for  unilateral  reduction  of  trade  barriers,  the  economic  gains  from
these  actions  would  clearly  be superior  to  those  of multilateral  actions.
For  example,  in  Graph  1,  if  other  countries  would  provide  credit  for  the
unilateral  trade  liberalization  program,  exports  could  shift  to say  line
III. Thus,  the  gains  from  unilateral  trade  liberalization  strategy  would
include  the  PV  of the  difference  between  A and  B from  to  to infinity  plus  the
PV of the  difference  between  line  I  and  line  III  from  to  to infinity.
Granting  no credit  for  unilateral  actions  is  tantamount  to  enticing  developing
countries  to  delay  their  liberalization.  This  is  not  in  the  interest  of the
multilaternl  trading  system  in  general,  nor  of industrial  countries  in
particular.  Hence,  the  crucial  importance  of agreeing  oin  the  credit  issue  in
the  Uruguay  Round.
The  last  assumption  is controversial.  The  nature  of the  MTNs  is to
exchange  trade  concessions.  Taken  to its  ultimate  consequence,  liberalizing
in the  MTNs  implies  that  as long  as a  participant  views  that  other  trading- 5  -
countries  have some trade barriers,  it  will have  an incentive  to keep some in
place in the hope that in the future,  they  could  be negotiated  away in
exchange for greater  market access.
In graph 1 this implies  that if the liberalization  that  a country is
considering  at to is a shift  to free  trade,  then this  will take place  at t
if, and only if, the concessions  given  by other  countries  are at least of
equal value.  There is  no reason  to expect  that this  balance  of concessions
will always exist.  A country  can be so protected  that  a shift to free trade
will increase  trade  more than what  other countries  can offer in exchange if
they would also shift  to free trade.  Tn this situation,  seeking  balanced
concessions in the  MTNs will not result  in free trade.  This appears to be the
case in Argentina,  which will be assessed in  the next section.
Another consequence  of following  the MTN strategy  is that  unlike the
case depicted in Graph 1, trade barriers  will most likely  be negotiated  over
several  MTNs.  This, for example,  has been the experience  of industrial
countries  (Bhagwati,  1988).
Graph 2 depicts this situation. Once again  at to a decision needs to
be taken between  a unilateral  liberalization  or waiting to  negotiate
reductions  of trade  barriers  in successive  MTNs.  The graph assumes that it
takes four  MTNs to achieve the  same trade liberalization  as the one considered
to be implemented  at to.  Again, the benefit  of negotiating  in the MTNs has
two components. The first is the increased  market  access gained by
negotiating.  This is represented  by the sum  of the rectangles  a, b and c, and
the  difference  between lines  I and II for the periods  extending  from  t4 to
infinity.  The second  component  is the benefit  to the country  of removing its-6-
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I.  Time  path  of exports  under  a unilateral  trade  liberalization  strategy
with  no credit  and  no free  ride.
II%  Time  path  of exports  under  a sequential  MTN  liberalization  strategy.
III.  Time,  path  of exports  under  no liberalization  and  no £ree  ride.- 7 -
own trade barriers.  This is  represented  by the sum  of a', b', c' and the
difference  between lines I and III from t4 to infinity. The cost of an MTN
liberalization  strategy is  given  by the extended  resource  misallocation.  In
Graph 2 this is represented  by the sum of ABCD plus rectangles  1, 2 and 3.
In contrast,  the  gains of unilateral  trade  liberalization  with no
free ride and no credit are given by the  higher exports  from improved  resource
allocation.  In Graph 2, this gain is represented  by the segment  AB summed
over the periods of time  extending  from to to infinity.  The costs are
represented  by the  market access  that would  have been gained  had the country
waited and negotiated in the  MTNs.  In  Graph 2, these  costs are represented  by
the sum of the rectangles  a, b, c and the difference  betwece.  lines I and II
for the periods extending  frcm  t4 to infinity.
The above analysis  has presented  the simple  economics  of unilateral
and multilateral  trade liberalization  strategies. The analysis could  perhaps
be made more realistic,  for  example,  by introducing  the  notion  of negotiating
power and allowing for the formation  of coalitions  among countries.  I don't
believe,  nevertheless,  that these  complications  could alter the basic
conclusion  of this paper.
III.  The Case of Argentina
This section  will provide  an estimate  of the economic  gains and costs
of alternative  trade liberalization  strategies  for Argentina.  The previous
discussion indicates  that two types  of information  are necessary  for
undertaking  this exercise.  First,  quantitative  information  is  needed on the
export gains associated  with negotiated  increases  in access to  other
countries'  markets  and export  gains  associated  with a unilateral  trade
liberalization  policy.  In the second  place,  a scenario  for the MTNs needs to-8-
be defined.  Subsections  1  and 2  will discuss these issues,  while subsection  3
will present and discuss the  estimates.
1.  Export  gains
It was concluded  from'  the previous  analysis  that the  greater the
costs from  other country's  trade  barriers,  the  more likely  it will be that the
comparison  will favor  an MTN approach to  trade liberalization. On the other
hand, the longer it takes to liberalize  in the MTNs and the easier it becomes
to free ride them,  the greater  the likelihood  that the analysis  will favor a
unilateral  trade liberalization.
Argentina is one of the few countries  for  which the available  data on
the export effects  of alternative  trade  strategies  allows to construct  an
approximate  estimate  of net gains of liberalizing  unilaterally  and
multilaterally.
In regard to the impact  on Argentina's  exports  of other countries'
trade policies,  Zietz and Valdez  (1987)  have estimated  that if industrial
countries removed their  barriers  to agricultural  imports,  exports  of these
goods would increase  substantially. The estimates  show  that exports  would
increase  by US$2,233  million for  beef;  US$208  million for  wheat;  and US$175
million for corn.  Prices  are in 1980  US dollars.  In this study,  Argentina is
the country that  would gain the  most from industrial  countries'  removal  of
barriers  to agricultural  trade.  As said,  this favors  the MTN liberalization
strategy.
In regard  to Argentina's  non-food  manufactured  exports--which  amount
to around US$2.0 billion--around  one third  go to industrial  countries,  where
they fac. few barriers  (Laird  and  Nogues, 1989).  Thus, these  countries'-9-
liberalization  of  manufactured  import  barriers  would  provide  only  marginal
benefits  to  Argentina.  1/
Likewise,  if  other  developing  countries  were  to  remove  their  trade
barriers,  Argentina  would  benefit  only  to  a small  extent. The  greatest
benefits  would  probably  come  from  liberalization  in  other  Latin  American
countries  (LAC)  and  in  particular  Brazil.  Nevertheless,  even  in  these  cases
liberalization  would  provide  relatively  small  export  gains  to  Argentina  in
relation  to liberalization  of  agricultural  protection.
Given  these  consid..a.ations,  it  appears  reasonable  to  assume  that
trade  liberalization  of  other  countries  would  increase  Argentina's  annual
exports  by  an amount  equivalent  to  US$3  billion  of 1980  dollars.
Let  me now  turn  to the  export  gains  that  Argentina  could  achieve  if
it  were to  remove  its  own  trade  barriers.  Sturzenegger  (1988)  has  estimated
that  under  free  trade  policies,  during  1980-85  Argentina  would  had  increased
its  agricultural  exports  by  significant  amounts.  In  this  study,  estimates  of
export  gains  are  provided  for  wheat,  corn,  sorghum,  soybean,  sunflower,  and
beef.  For  the  period  1980-85,  Sturzenegger  estimates  that  if  Argentina  had
been  under  a free  trade  regime,  on  average,  annual  exports--in  current
dollars--of  these  products  would  had  been  US$7.1  billion  higher  than  what  they
actually  were. In  real  1980  prices,  annual  exports  would  had  been  US$8.3
billion  higher.
Research  has  also  shown  that  the  efficient  industries  of Argentina's
manufacturing  sector  would  also  benefit  significantly  from  the  removal  of
1/  Industrial  countries'  tariff  escalation  from  raw  materials  to foodstuffs
is  probably  the  most  serious  barrier  faced  by  manufactured  food  exports  of
Argentina  in  industrial  countries.  Unfortunately,  no  estimates  of the
trade  gains  of  reducing  this  escalation  are  available.- 10  -
trade barriers  that  re protecting  several  inefficient  manufacturing
industries  (Nogues,  1985).  Unfortunately,  there  are no measurement  of the
potential  export  gains  of manufactured  products  from  unilateral  trade
liberalization  policies.  Although  it is  more than  likely that trade
liberalization  will increase  Argentina's  manufactured  exports,  I prefer to be
conservative.  I will therefore  assume that  the export  gains  are those
indicated  for  agricultural  products,  i.e.  US$8  billion  per year.
2.  The multilateral  scenario
Having introduced  the basic  figures,  let  me now  discuss a reasonable
MTN scenario  for  making the economic  estimates.  Several  issues  must be
decided including:
- the time span it  will take  for other  countries  to lower their  trade
barriers;
- the speed  of the unilateral  trade  liberalization;
- the time span  until resources  are reallocated  and efficiently  used;
- the importance  of short-run  transitional  costs;
- the extent  of internalization  in the  MTNs;
- the  multilateral  formula  for reducing  trade barriers;
- the time elapsed  until the first  MTN negotiation  takes  place;  and
- the rate of return for  discounting  future  flows.
On the first  question, it  is known that  the US and the Cairns  group's
proposal for  dismantling  agricultural  trade barriers  in ten  years will not go
through.  I  will assume that it  will take 20 years.  Simulations  will also be
provided for 15 years  --  a rosy scenario  which favors  the  MTN strategy.  As
said, I assume  that other  countries'  trade  barriers  to  manufactured  trade are
not all that important  for Argentina.In regard  to the  speed  of the  unilateral  trade  liberalization,  I  will
assume  that  there  is  a sudden  shift  of policy. This  is  not  a crucial
assumption.  What  is  important  for  the  results  is  that  the  unilateral  trade
liberalization  be implemented  faster  than  the  multilateral.
Even  under  a unilateral  traue  liberalization,  I  assume  that  there  is
a time  span  until  resources  are  reallo^ated  and  efficiently  used. There  are
two  causes. The  first  is  associated  with  the  characteristics  of the
production  processes  of  agricultural  products  where  the  lag  between  production
decisions  and  the  corresponding  output  flow  is  usually  one  year. Also,  in  the
unilateral  shift  to free  trade,  it is  unlikely  that  in  only  one  year  Argentina
could  reach  a  value  of  increased  potential  exports  as  high  as forecasted,
i.e.,  US$8  billion  of 1980  dollars.  I  will  assume  that  it  takes  four  years  to
reach  this  potential.  I  will  also  assume  that  each  of  the  years  between  the
second  and  fifth  after  liberalization  is  introduced,  exports  increase  by 25%
of  the  potential  or  US$2.0  billion  per  year. I  will  assume  that  this  later
delay  is  not  present  in the  MTN  strategy  because  in  this  case,  entrepreneurs
know  in  advance  the  gradual  policy  shifts  and  adjust  accordingly.
An ongoing  debate  in the  literature  refers  to  the  social  costs  of
trade  liberalization.  These  short-run  costs  are  incurred  mainly  when  the
resource  reallocation  process  triggered  by  trade  liberalization  policies
result  in  short-run  unemployment  of  resources.  New  evidence  on the  experience
with  trade  liberalization  policies  in  developing  countries  suggests  that  these
costs  might  not  be  as  high  as  many  people  think. It  has  been  found  "...that
even  in  the  short  run,  liberalization  does  not  lower  production  and  does  not
inhibit  economic  growth; rather,  it  is  clearly  associated  with  faster
growth. This  is  particularly  true  for  episodes  of strong  liberalization- 12  -
policies--precisely  those  instances  in  which,  presumably,  rigidities  and  lags
in  positive  responses  should  have  led  to  a temporary  lose  of  production..."
(Michaely,  Choksi,  and  PapaSeorgiou,  1989).
The  own  experience  of  Argentina  does  not  give  much  clue  on this
issue. Probably  one  of the  worst  trade  liberalization  policy  packages  of the
post  World  War  II  years  is  the  one  implemented  by  Argentina--the  only  one  it
has  implemented--during  1976-1981.  This  attempt  failed  not  because  of  the
trade  policy  component  of this  package,  but  because  of the  macroeconomic
disequilibrium  which  implied  among  other  things  a record  overvaluation  of the
domestic  currency. Cavallo  and  Cottani  (1989),  Nogues  (1986)  and  several
other  researchers  have  attributed  the  costs  associated  with  this  experiment  to
the  macroeconomic  effects  of  the  program  rather  than  to the  trade
liberalization  implemented  during  these  years. Therefore,  in  the  empirical
estimation,  I  have  assumed  that,  except  for  the  time  lags  mentioned  above,
there  are  no short-run  social  costs  associated  with  temporary  unemployed
resources.
As said,  in  regard  to  the  extent  of internalization  in the  MTNs,
Finger  (1976)  has  shown  that  it  has  been  high  but  not  complete.  In today's
protectionist  environment,  it  is  more  likely  for  internalization  of
concessions  to  increase. I  will  present  two  estimates.  I  will  first  assume
that  Argentina  follows  the  mercantilistic  approach  tit  for  tat,  i.e.,  that
what  it  gives  away  is  exactly  equal  to  what  it  receives.  A second  estimate
will  assume  that  Argentina  shifts  to  free  trade  even  if  other  countries  are
not  able  to  reciprocate  fully. Therefore,  in this  later  estimate  Argentina
gives  more  in  trade  concessions  than  what  it  receives  from  other  countries.- 13  -
Now something  needs to be said on the negotiating  formula for
reducing  trade  barriers in the MTNs.  In this  regard,  I will assume that the
removal  of trade  barriers is such that increased  exports from improved  market
access and improved  resource  allocation increases  by the same amount  every
year.
The time elapsed  until the first  MTN removal  of trade barriers is
important.  The closer this  episode is to the  moment when the decision is being
judged, the greater  the gains of participating  in the  MTNs.  Given that
negotiators  in the Ururguay  Round have  agreed to continue  discussing
agricultural  trade  policies,  but that barriers  are expected to decline  only by
the end of the  Round, I have assumed  that from to it takes two years before
the  MTN liberalization  program  starts  to  work.
Finally, in  regard to the discount  rate, I  have used a figure  of
15%.  The relatively  high figure  is justified  by Argentina's  debt situation.
3.  The estimates
Table 1 shows  the benefita  to  Argentina  of following  an MTN
liberalization  strategy.  Under the assumption  that  Argentina shifts  to free
trade  even if its trading  partners  are unable to  grant concessions  of equal
value, the present  value (PV) of increased  exports  are US$31.3  billion and
US$25.6 billion in  liberalizations  implemented  in 15  and 20 years,
respectively.
In the case when Argentina  seeks  balanced  concessions,  the  gains in
terms  of exports from resource  allocation  are equal to those of increased
market access.  In this case,  the gains in liberalization  implemented  in 15
and 20 years are US$17.9  billion  and US$14.4  billion,  respectively.- 14 -
The cost of liberalizing  in the  MTNs is  given by the resource
misallocation  of keeping trade  barriers  for longer  than they  would have, had a
unilateral liberalization  strategy  been followed. Assuming that Argentina
removes  all trade  barriers,  the PV of the costs  of MTN participation  are
US$35.3  billion and US$38.8  billion  for liberalizations  implemented  during 15
and 20 years, respectively. Thus,  the costs in terms  of forgone  exports of a
relatively  slow negotiated  removal  of trade  barriers  are  higher than the
benefits  and the net PV of a negotiated  shift  to free trade shown in  Table 2
is  negative.
In the case  where Argentina  seeks  balanced  concessions,  it will
reduce  barriers up to the point  where the value  of increased  imports  is equal
to those received  from other  countries;  i.e.,  US$3 billion.  This implies
that  Argentina  will keep in place trade  barriers  which  are costly.  Thus, the
net PV will be lower than that  associated  with  a shift  to free  trade.  In the
case  where Argentina  grants concessions  equivalent  to US$3.0 billion  per year
(equal  to those received  from trading  partners),  the  cost of resource
misallocation  in terms  of foregone  exports  amounts  to US$46.6 billion  and
US$47.9 billion  for MTN's lasting  15  years and 20 years,  respectively.
These results  do not imply  that  an MTN liberalization  strategy is  not
desirable.  Any liberalization  is superior  to the status-quo  of protection.
If  protection  were to remain  unchanged  to eternity,  the PV of forgone  exports
would amount to US$53 billion.  This figure is  quite  higher than those
presented in  Table 2.- 15  -
Table 1:  PRESENT  VALUE  OF EXPORTS  UNDER  AN MTN
LIBERALIZATION  STRATEGY
(Millions  of Dollars)
Years
Source  of Economic  Gain  15  20
A.  Shift to Free  Trade
Resource Allocation  22,311  18,401
Market access  8,966  7,198
Total:  31,277  25,599
B.  Balanced Concessions
Resource allocation  8,966  7,198
Market access  8,966  7,198
Total:  17,932  14,396
Table  2:  NET PRESENT VALUE OF  INCREASED EXPORTS
UNDER  AN MTN LIBERALIZATION STRATEGY
(Millions  of Dollars)
Years
Extent of Liberalization  15  20
Shift to free trade  -4.0  -9.7
Balanced  concessions  -25.6  -32.0
Finally, the  net present  value of following  a unilateral  trade
liberalization  is equal to the difference  between  the benefit  of improved
resource  allocation  and costs of  market access  that would  had been  obtained
had Argentina  negotiated.  Another cost  mentioned  above, is  the time it takes- 16  -
Argentina to fully  reap the benefits  of free trade policies.  As indicated
above, I have assumed that this lag is  of five  years.  Under  the assumptions,
Table 3 shows that the  net PV of  a unilateral  trade liberalization  program is
US$19.0 billion.  This compares  with a net PV of minus US$4.0 in  a shift to
free trade  negotiated  multilaterally  during  a period  of 15  years.  It also
compares  with the PV of maintaining  the status-quo  of minus  US$53 billion.
Table 3:  NET PRESENT  VALUE  OF A UNILATERAL
TRADE  LIBERALIZATION
(Millions  of Dollars)
Source of Economic  Gains
and Costs
Improved  resource  allocation  43,776
Loss of market access  a/  7,198
Loss  from  lags in  adjustment  to  a fully
efficient  economy  17,557
Total:  19,021
a/  Loss of  market access in a 15-year  MTN.
IV.  Extensions  and the Credit  Issue
In deciding  between  a unilateral  or a multilateral  trade
liberalization  strategy,  political  and economic factors  must be taken into
account.  This note has centered  its  analysis  on the economics  of this
decision.  The exercise is useful in  that it points to some of the issues that
must be considered  when evaluating  these  alternative  courses  of actions.
The analysis  has  shown that  an MTN liberalization  strategy  of-17  -
balanced concessions  is more likely  to be economically  preferable  to a
unilateral strategy  when:
- the costs to the country  of other country'  trade barriers
are higher--in  some cases significantly  higher-- than the
costs of its own trade  barriers;
- the  MTN will give  no credit  for unilateral  actions;
- there is  no free riding  of the  MTNs, or if there  is, it
will only be a small  fraction  of what the country  would
obtain  under full participation  in the  MTNs.
For Argentina,  I have argued  that in spite of being  one of the
:ountries  most seriously  affected  by other countries'  barriers  and in
particular  by industrial  countries'  agricultural  policies ,  the net PV of a
unilateral  liberalization  is significantly  higher than that  of a multilateral
negotiated liberalization.
What about other  developing  countries?  The general conclusion  that
stems from the analysis  is that  as long  as the costs suffered  by a country
from its own trade barriers  are  higher than those suffered  because  of other
countries'  barriers, it still pays  to liberalize  unilaterally.  In this
regard, the structure  of protection  in industrial  and developing  countries
show that in  general  the latter  have  more protectionist  trade policies  than
the former (Laird  and Nogues, 1989).  Thus, to the extent that trade  of
developing  countries  takes  place  mainly  with industrial  countries,  it would
appear that it does not pay to negotiate  in the MTNs;  i.e.,  liberalization
under relatively  balanced concessions  will unlikely  result in liberal  trade
regimes for developing  countries.
But the  world is  driven  also by politics,  which implies  that even if
developing countries  were aware that the  gains from unilateral  trade- 18  -
liberalization  are far  superior  than those  of an MTN strategy,  many would
perhaps still  decide  to wait and attempt to extract  concessions  in the MTNs.
This is the strategy  that industrial  countries  decided  to follow  after World
War II, and it is also likely  the strategy  that an increasing  number  of
developing  countries  might decide to follow  as they familiarize  themselves
with the politics of the  MTNs.
This is  a cost for  developing  countries  and for the trading system.
Given that  we must live  wtih the  MTNs, it is important  to try to seek  ways of
reducing the costs  entailed by them.  In this sense,  policies  can be designed
to help developing  countries  reach  an agreement  to liberalize  faster  than the
pace dictated by the MTNs.  Maximizing  internalization  of the MTNs and not
providing  credit  for unilateral  trade liberalization  programs  are signals
taken by developing  countries  in favor  of an MTN liberalization  strategy.
If  industrial  countries  were to  give credit to developing  countries
for unilateral  liberalization  programs,  the economics  and politics  would
clearly shift in favor  of faster  reform  programs.  If credit  were given,
negotiating in the  MTN would  never be preferable  to a unilateral  trade
liberalization  strategy.  In the case of  Argentina  presented  in Table 3, the
net PV of a unilateral  trade  liberalization  would increase  from US$19 billion
in a situation  of no credit,  to US$33.4  billion in  a situation  where credit
granted is increasing  during  the first 15 years  and thereafter  remains
constant.
Likewise,  the political  excuse for  not liberalizing  unilaterally
would suffer  a major blow.  International  pressures  as well as the interest  of
domestic exporters  would shift  in favor  of fast reform  programs.  Such  actions
from  developing  countries  would improve  their  economic  prospects  and enhance- 19  -
the international  trading system. Thus the  urgency  of deciding on the credit
issue.
V.  Summary  and Conclusions
This paper has developec  a simple  framework  for analyzing  the
economic costs  and benefits  of unilateral  and multilateral  trade
liberalization  strategies.  Applying  the framework  to Argentina,  I estimate
that the difference  in terms of exports  between  the net present  value of a
unilateral  and a 15-year  MTN liberalization  to free trade  is US$23 billion in
favor of the first.
The structure  of protection  between  countries  suggests  that  only few
developing  countries  would  gain by  waiting to bargain  their trade  restrictions
in the MTNs instead  of implementing  a unilateral  trade liberalization
program.  This presumption  stems  from the fact that  an important  part of
exports from  developing  countries  go to industrial  countries  and as a general
rule, the first  group of countries  are  more protected  than the second group.
The analysis  could be complicated  in many  ways, but it is  unlikely
that the basic conclusion--that  unilateral  trade  liberalization  actions
provide significant  more economic  gains  than  a similar  liberalization
negotiated  multilaterally  over  many years--could  be altered.
We do not see significant  unilateral  trade  liberalization  actions
taken by many developing  countries. This might be in part  due to the fact
that they  are increasingly  driven  by politics  and only marginally  by economics
to participate  in the  MTNs.  Because  of this, I have  argued that if industrial
countries  were to grant  credit for  unilateral  trade  liberalization  actions
implemented  by developingy  countries,  both the  economics  and politics  would
shift in favor  of these  programs.- 20 -
References
Bhagwati,  Jagdish,  "Protectionism,"  MIT Press,  1988.
Cavallo,  Domingo  and Joaquin Cottani,  "The  Timing  and Sequencing  of a Trade
Liberalization:  Argentina,"  The  World Bank (mimeo,  1988).
Finger,  J. Michael, "Trade  Liberalization. A Public  Choice  Perspective",  in
Challenges  to a Liberal  International  Economic  Order (Washington: American
Enterprise  Institute,  1980).
Laire, Samuel  and Nogues, Julio,  "Trade Policies  and the Debt Crisis",  The World
Bank Economic  Review,  May 1989.
Michaely,  Michael,  Armeane Choksi  and Demetris  Papageorgiou,  "The Design of
Trade Liberalization",  Finance  and Development,  March 1989.
Nogues, Julio, "Distortions,  Factor  Proportions  and Efficiency  Losses,"
Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv, 1985,  Band 121,  Heft 2.
Nogues, Julio, "The  Nature of Argentina's  Policy  Re;forms  During 1976-81,"  World
Bank Staff  Working Papers  No 765.
Sturzenegger,  Adolfo, "Price  Discrimination  in  the Pampas:  The Political-
Economy  of an Anti-Dutch  Disease,"  The World Bank (mimeo),  1988.
Valdes, Alberto and Zietz,  Joaquin,  "The  Costs of Protectionism  to  Developing
Countries,"  World Bank Staff  Working Paper  No. 789, 1987.PPR Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS216 Price and Quality Effects of
Vets-Revisited:  A Case Study of
Korean Footwear Exports  Jaime de Melo  June 1989  M. Ameal
L. Alan Winters  61466
WPS217 Public Debt, North and South  Helmut Reisen
WPS218 Public Finance, Trade and
Development: The Chilean Experience  Vittorio Corbo  July 1989  A. Oropesa
61758
WPS219 Rural Credit in Developing  Countries  Avishay  Braverman  June 1989  C. Spooner
J. Luis Guasch  37570
WPS220 Capacity  Building for Policy  Analysis  Samuel Paul  July 1989  E. Madrona
David Steedman  61712
Francis X. Sutton
WPS221 How Does Uncernainty  About the Real
Exchange  Rate Affect Exports?  Ricardo J. Caballero  June 1989  A. Orepesa
Vittorio Corbo  61758
WPS222 Why Stabilisation  Policies in Zambia
Did Not Succeed  Christopher 'olclough
WPS223 Overvalued  and Undervalued Exchange
Rates in An Equilibrium  Optimizing
Model  Jose Saul Lizondo
WPS224 The Economics  of the Government
Budget Constraint  Stanley Fischer  May 1989  S. Fischer
33774
WPS225 Targeting Assistance to the Poor.
Using Household  Survey Dma  Paul Glewwe  June 1989  B. Rosa
Oussama Kanaan  33751
WPS226 Inflation and the Costs of
Stabilization: Historical Cases,
Recent Experiences  and Policy  Lessons  Andres Solimano
WPS227 Institutional  Reforms in Sector
Adjustment Operations  Samuel Paul
WPS228 Economic Performance of Developing
Countries in the 1980s  Robert Lynn
F. Desmond McCarthy
WPS229 The Effect of Demographic  Changes  on Saving
for Ufe-Cycle Motives in Developing
Countries  Steven B. Webb  July 1989  E. Khine
Heidi Zia  61765
WPS230 Unemployment,  Migration  and Wages
in Turkey, 1962-1985  Bent Hansen  July 1989  J. Timmins
39248
WPS231 The World Bank Revised Minimum
Standard Model  Doug Addison  May 1989  J. Onwuemene-
Kocha
61750PPR  Workine Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for Paper
WPS232  Women and Food Security in Kenya  Nadine R. Horenstein  June 1989  M. Villar
33752
WPS233  Public Enterprise Reform in Adjustment
Lending  John Nellis
WPS234 A Consistency  Framework Macroeconomic
Analysis  William  Easterly  June 1989  R. Luz
61760
WPS235 Borrowing, Resource Transfers
and External Shocks to Developing
Countries:  Historical and
Counterfactual  Steven  Webb  July 1989  E. Khine
Heidi Zia  61765
WPS236 Education and Earnings in Peru's
Informal Nonfarm Family Enterprises  Peter Moock  July 1989  M.  Fisher
Philip Musgrove  34819
Morton  Stccner
WPS237 The Curricular Content of Primary
Education in Developing Countrics  Aaron Benavot  June 1989  C. Cristobal
David Kamens  33640
WPS238 The Distributional Consequences  of  a
Tax Reform on a VAT  for  Pakistan  Ehtisham Ahmad
Stephen Ludlow
WPS239 The Choice Between Unilateral and Multi-
lateral Trade Liberalization  Strategies  Julio Nogues  July 1989  S. Torrijos
33709